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Ecosystem services have been identified as a central link

between society, or human systems, and the structure and
function of natural systems (e.g., U.S. LTER 2007, MEA
2005). A fundamental economic problem is that while
almost everyone—environmental groups, policy makers,
and broad segments of the general public—seems to believe ecosystem services are valuable, the available public
policy tools and approaches for private action fall short,
and often omit, a direct link to the real values of the people. If ecosystem services are of economic value, then a
fundamental challenge concerns how to identify the link
between ecosystem services and the quality of life of individual households, and how to use that link to integrate
ecosystem service values into the decisions of businesses and
individuals in society. Given current markets and policies
decision–makers are unable to recognize the full value of
services ecosystems provide. What can be done to integrate
ecosystem service values into the economy? After reviewing
a fundamental cause for why markets often overlook ecosystem services, and after considering some limitations of
the often effective approaches of philanthropy and government, we consider the potential to leverage experimental
economics to create and test approaches to integrate values
at the individual level into markets addressing ecosystem
services.

A Fundamental Problem
One daunting frontier for ecosystem services originates
from the natural character of many services, which sharply
restricts or prevents the ability of providers to capture a
return from many, often most, beneficiaries. This is the nature of “public goods” and “fugitive resources.” Both involve

“nonexclusivity”: providers cannot exclude beneficiaries
from benefit without payment for the cost of provision. For
public goods, many people may benefit simultaneously, so
no one provider (or user–beneficiary) can exclude anyone
else at any particular moment. An owner of undeveloped
farm, forest or lake shore often cannot insist on payment
from the sprawling, urban–fringe residents who value open
space for aesthetic tranquility; therefore, the landowner has
little incentive to consider his community’s open space values in choices about current use of his land. For fugitive
resources, Nature does not allow a provider to contain and
control the resource she has provided or protected; rivers
flow and wildlife migrate across boundaries. A farmer or
lawn–owner whose fertilizer percolates to the Mississippi
or Potomac cannot insist on a return from the fishermen
who would gain from a smaller Gulf Coast dead–zone, or
from the patrons of oyster bars who seek a Chesapeake
culture of local shellfish. Moreover, the opportunity for
every beneficiary to benefit without payment creates the
incentive to “free ride” or hang back and wait for potential
providers—or public–spirited philanthropists—to “do the
right thing” at their own expense, despite their own opportunity to ride free on others’ generosity.
As a result, the could–be bounty of ecosystem services,
and the conditions of ecosystem structure and function, often arise as a residual, left–over after–thought of decisions
that potential providers make to sustain their livelihoods.
For example, even conservation–minded farmers must implement practices within the annual, weather–dependent,
schedule of their business, and society receives fish, wildlife, open space and water quality that results (or doesn’t
result).
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Current Solutions
To be sure, we have institutions, public policies and private actions underway that mitigate the nonexclusive
nature of Nature’s services. But most
existing tools remain short on their
ability to integrate ecosystem services
into the economy in a manner that
is fully commensurate with familiar,
commercially viable products.
Government authority generates
land–use and environmental regulations that place enforceable limits on
the degree to which individuals and
firms can impose consequences on a
broader community, such as through
pollution or use of resources held
in the public trust, with impacts on
public health or endangered species.
Government can also implement incentive payments which directly or
indirectly compensate providers for
actions to provide for ecosystem services, such as through federally funded conservation reserve or wetland
reserve programs. It should be noted
that, as market–based approaches,
government incentive payments primarily focus on the supply side opportunity costs of providers, such as
compensating farmers who forego
crop production on land enrolled in a
conservation reserve. Centrally–guided incentive payments may reflect politically or bureaucratically attenuated
demand–side, public values through
a benefit–cost analysis, but, in this
article, we discuss the potential to integrate demand–side values through
more complete market mechanisms.
Philanthropy, such as through
wildlife conservation organizations
or land trusts, can provide complementary actions. Philanthropists can
provide payments for ecosystem services by, for example, compensating
ranchers for tolerating wolves or purchasing conservation easements on
undeveloped farms or forests. Philanthropists can stimulate government
action by offering matching funds
for taxpayer–approved conservation
bond–issues or providing some off48
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sets for debts of developing countries
that protect biodiversity. Of course
philanthropy exists under the shadow
of incentives for individuals to ride
free–waiting for some other donor to
step forward.
Clearly, however, the limitations
of government and philanthropic action may create additional expenses
or opportunities lost. Philanthropists
face their dependence on good will of
donors, and costs to fight free–riding,
and despite the effectiveness and nimbleness that can come from a carefully focused mission, philanthropic
approaches can generate bureaucratic
costs. Government may be better positioned to provide a broad approach,
perhaps including equity considerations, casting a wide umbrella supported by more stable (if sometimes
controversial) funding. But government’s costs to obtain detailed (local–level) information, to safeguard
public integrity, and to balance political tensions, can sometimes create
the agility and efficiency of a bull at
Tiffany’s china shop. Both may find
it difficult to focus their mission or
goals in detailed alignment with the
interests of a diverse public.
In contrast, decentralized market
approaches to provision of valued
goods and services are respected for
agility, responsiveness to diverse preferences, and efficiency in directly aggregating consequences of individual
values and choices into fairly universal signals of relative scarcity (called
relative prices). Often supported by a
coalition of nationally or internationally known, large, commercial firms
and philanthropic organizations, we
see nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) developing standards and
practices for certification of ecosystem
or natural resource–based products as
“sustainably produced” through harvest and process chains that are environmentally friendly. The Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC), concerning seafood, and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), concerning
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forest products, provide two examples, and we are witnessing a proliferation of green–marketing efforts—
sometimes supported by third–party
verification exemplified by MSC or
FSC eco–labeling—whereby firms
are recognizing a public demand for
attention to environmental stewardship. While laudable, these efforts tie
ecosystem services to the consumer’s
choices among familiar commercial
products, rather than directly targeting the consumer’s value for specified
ecosystem services.
Approaches to ecosystem services
based primarily on a natural–science
perspective can overlook another significant challenge: identification of
what people value, rather than simply what scientists currently measure.
From the human household’s perspective, what is the service? Physical
measures of ecosystem output, such
as for water quality and quantity, may
often be salient and intuitive for, say,
provisioning services like water for
drinking or irrigation purposes. But
what about measures linking water
quality and services of interest for
recreation? Egan, Herriges, Kling
and Downing (forthcoming) show
that individual households, pursuing
a diverse set of activities, are responsive to a broad suite of water quality
measures suggested by biologists, but
careful modeling is needed to link biological measures through the process
by which households seek ecosystem
services and therefore value various
dimensions of water quality.

Innovation Addressing Consumer
Values
Private NGOs, government, and
academia have stimulated innovative
work on the valuation of ecosystem
services. Society’s representatives’
need a better understanding of what
it is that households actually value
from ecosystems. We need, and are
pursuing, better methods to measure
value, and to link available actions to
restore or sustain ecosystem structure

and functions that yield desirable
ecosystem services. Support for the
social science of ecosystem services is
critical to developing effective policies
supporting the public welfare.
But what is substantially missing
from the mission of economics relative
to ecosystem services is work focused
on integrating values directly into the
economy, particularly demand–side
values. Market–based approaches
that integrate demand–side values
give the people a direct and immediate voice—an economic voice—to
indicate whether particular levels of
or changes in ecosystem services are
more or less valuable than particular
levels of or changes in familiar, commercially produced goods.
How can society stimulate the
integration of demand–side values in
policies and market–based approaches addressing ecosystem services? This
integration is already done for many
provisioning services of ecosystems,
through long established markets
for food, fiber and natural resource–
based commodities. How can we
directly attack nonexcludability and
give beneficiaries an economic voice
upon which entrepreneurs can capture a return from enhancement of
ecosystem services?
Experimental economists are
increasingly investigating mechanisms that stimulate individuals to
go beyond baseline donations and to
transform a higher portion of their
values into revenues in support of
public goods. Experimental economists bring human subjects into a
controlled laboratory setting to study
how incentives and rules of exchange
lead to individual or collective choices and outcomes. In public goods
experiments, researchers design a set
of monetary payoffs that individuals
can earn through their choices, and
these payoffs simulate the manner in
which individuals benefit from real
public goods. For example, working
agricultural ecosystems might give rural residents aesthetic pleasure when

farms provide grassland habitats for
songbirds; every member of the community receives a “songbird benefit”
whenever the habitat is provided,
regardless of who bore the costs. In
the laboratory, a group of individuals
may be asked to pay for provision of
a group–fund that provides a monetary return to everyone in the group,
including those members who chose
not to invest. Since the group–fund
does not exclude noncontributors
from benefiting, it comprises an abstract, monetized simulation of a
public good.
Such experiments have shown
that changing the incentives for individuals to ride free on the contributions of others can increase the degree
to which individuals voluntarily pay
for the cost of a public good and can
bring their payments into a closer
correspondence with their own value
for the good. While practical mechanisms reduce the incentives for individuals to free–ride, additional effort
is needed to evaluate and improve the
degree to which mechanisms balance
the provision of benefits net of costs.
Since many people benefit simultaneously, an efficient balance of costs and
benefits occurs when a provider delivers increments of public good until
the costs of delivering the last unit
are just offset by the combined total
amount that all beneficiaries would
willingly pay for that increment rather than doing without it.
Since different people have different values, some may value the public
good more or less highly than others,
so a combined total amount may involve different people paying different prices. This issue is not surprising;
obviously with familiar donations
mechanisms, different people donate
different amounts. But it means the
nonexcludable character of some ecosystem services will require entrepreneurs to explain the rationale for market mechanisms to newcomers from
the general public.

Real Markets for Ecosystem
Services
The insights from economics experiment already offer potential to
support markets for real ecosystem
services. Through USDA funding,
the authors have established an experimental market in Jamestown, R.I.
This example shows both promising
results and significant areas where
progress requires additional work to
design and test mechanisms by which
entrepreneurs could develop ecosystem service markets.
Jamestown is widely regarded for
supporting conservation of undeveloped farm, forest and open space
and is in the process of completing
transactions to purchase development rights on the last few operating
farms. However, while setting aside
development rights may prevent the
construction of additional residential
neighborhoods or other developed
uses, it may still be challenging for
farmers to maintain farm operations.
Moreover, changes in the intensity of
farming, along with rising costs for
energy or other inputs, push more
ecosystem services outside the margin
that farmers can sustain while maintaining their business.
This applies, for example, to the
cultural or aesthetic services provided
by grassland wildlife to residents who
seek to live in a rural community that
supports a healthy ecosystem. The
experimental market centered on selling, to Jamestown residents, an opportunity to protect grassland habitats during the nesting season. This
product was presented as contracts
with farmers who agreed to forego
hay harvesting and restrict grazing
on 10–acre fields during eight weeks
from the beginning of May to the beginning of July.
Using insights from laboratory
experiments, the research design allowed a comparative test of three
market mechanisms, including one
intended only to measure potential
value and two intended to raise rev-
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enues sufficient to cover the costs of
a contract. The study created an experimental (but nonprofit) business
and advertised under the trade mark
of the Nature Services Exchange of
Jamestown, created as a partnership
of the University of Rhode Island
and EcoAsset Markets Inc., an independent business in Providence, R.I.
Residents were randomly assigned to
groups. Each household in a group
was asked to make a monetary offer
subject to rules of the market mechanism assigned to that group; offers
were made by personal check or by
credit–card authorization.
The rules for all mechanisms included a “provision point,” which
corresponds to the minimum amount
of funding that a group must provide
in order to cover the costs of a public good. In Jamestown, the provision point is linked to the cost of a
contract with a farmer who agrees to
omit any harvest of hay on a specified,
10–acre field during the late–spring
nesting season for Bobolinks, a grassland–nesting bird. Contracts were negotiated to cover the farmer’s cost to
replace the loss of feed by foregoing a
hay harvest and to compensate for additional risk and management inconvenience to manipulate herds around
the protected field(s). However, the
provision point is more than a simple
fundraising goal; rather it also comprises an implicit (beneficent) threat
that a specific, quantified increase
in the services of a public good will
not occur unless the group provides
for its costs. Laboratory experiments
have shown a money–back–guarantee reinforces the provision point and
the tie between contributions and the
specific service offered. The guarantee
establishes the rule that if funding
falls short of the provision point, so
the good is not provided, the fundraiser (seller) will not simply redirect
revenues to other purposes. The provision point and money–back–guarantee rules reduce the incentives to ride
free because group members (should)
realize that the responsibility lies with
50
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the defined group and no one outside
the group, so there are limitations on
the opportunity to wait for others
to pay. These rules were used in the
Jamestown experimental market.
Laboratory experiments have also
demonstrated that rules to rebate excess funds to contributors increase
the offers that individuals will make,
given their values. Rebates reduce the
free–riding incentive for individuals
to hold–back in a strategic effort to
offer just–the–right–amount rather
than paying more than was necessary
after the contributions of others. The
rebate feature was varied across mechanisms tested in Jamestown.
Our “pivotal mechanism” (PM)
established a full rebate to any individual whose offer was not needed
to meet the provision point for their
field after all other contributions from
their group were taken into account.
This PM creates an incentive for each
person to view their own contribution as if it was the last one needed,
and their decision would make–or–
break the outcome for their group’s
hayfield. The PM provides incentives
for individuals to reveal their full willingness to pay to protect a hayfield
for grassland birds, but it’s advantage
in measuring value is off–set by the
practical limitation that very few or
no individuals will be pivotal in most
situations, so the PM generally fails to
raise actual revenues.
Our “proportional rebate” (PR)
mechanism is one of two we designed to raise revenues. Under the
PR rules, any funds collected above
the amount needed to cover the cost
of a farm contract would be rebated
to each contributor in proportion to
their own contribution to the total of
all contributions from their group.
In our 2007 market, the second revenue–raising mechanism used the set
of offers from a group to calculate the
lowest possible “uniform price” (UP)
such that everyone who paid would
receive a rebate of the excess of their
offer above the UP; anyone who of-
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fered to pay less than the UP would
receive a full refund. Under the UP,
everyone who pays will pay the same
price (after their rebate).
The market generated total offers of around $9700, across all three
mechanisms, with substantial variation across groups depending upon
the rules by which excess funds would
be rebated. Based on laboratory experiments, we expected the PR mechanism to come closest to the “full
value” estimated under the pivotal
mechanism (PM), and Jamestown’s
preliminary results support this prediction. While the UP approach was
expected to, and did, elicit lower
offers (and lower revenues) from
groups, in on–going research we are
investigating the possibility that similar mechanisms may produce more
stable revenues year–after–year, as
compared to PR. In the 2007 market, of six hayfields available for bird
conservation, revenues met the provision points for three. Initial analysis
suggests, however, that for about 400
homes participating there is potential
value–as revealed under the various
mechanisms– ranging from $8800 to
$28,000 to protect a field for grassland birds. The on–going challenge
will be finding better ways to align
revenues with this potential value.
The Jamestown experience shows
that, even in the case of a cultural
or aesthetic ecosystem service, experimental economic markets might
prove successful. In Jamestown, all
three of the fields that were ultimately
protected would have been harvested
during the 2007 nesting season had
the farmers been unable to obtain support to offset costs to their operation.
Moreover, other data from this study
suggests that not only did residents
value contracts focused on Bobolinks,
but they may also value contracts that
help farmers to restore previously
idled hayfields to a state that provides
additional habitat and also eliminates
invasive plants that may be harmful
to other aesthetically–valued wildlife

(like the monarch butterfly). The ecosystem service market may eventually
enable farmers to expand their operations with services that Jamestown’s
exurban residents’ value.

Concluding Observations
Developing mechanisms to enable
entrepreneurs to leverage consumer
values may substantially expand the
potential for market approaches to
lead to valuable impacts for ecosystem services. Consider for a moment
the cap–and–trade approaches used
for air and water pollutants, and currently under discussion for carbon
emissions. If market mechanisms
create a closer alignment between individual and collective values and incentives to support the public good,
then markets may create an avenue by
which communities can directly influence the key choice of the overall cap
on emissions; individuals and groups
who value a further reduction in emissions could buy and retire a quantity
of permits in a manner that effectively
lowers the overall cap. Markets enable
private action that can complement
or improve upon the government, or
philanthropic, actions already underway for ecosystem services.
Here again the Jamestown Bobolink market provides an example. After
seeing a summary of the experimental
market in Audubon magazine in November 2007, a community–garden
club in Grant, Minnesota, contacted
the authors and developed their own
entrepreneurial approach to protect
a hayfield next to their community
garden. This year their club members
have rented the hayfield in consideration of grassland birds, illustrating
that once enabled, entrepreneurship
can expand to enhance the provision of ecosystem services in a nimble
fashion.
Furthermore, research on the
implementation of ecosystem service markets may benefit from interdisciplinary teams and inclusion of
outreach. In Jamestown, farmers’ in-

dependent experimentation is likely
to yield modifications to contracts,
such as to plan for early–season grazing, that both enhance farmers’ ability to deliver ecosystem services and
lower the costs (or provision points)
implied. At this writing, Jamestown
farmers are weighing options to alter grass species in their hayfields, to
better manage joint production of
grassland birds and feed for livestock
(G. Neale, personal communication).
Moreover, ecological research on bird
behavior may enable the design of
methods that allow environmental
managers to guide birds toward fields
that are likely to be protected in the
next season. Such considerations may
be critical to establishing hayfield harvest rotations through a series of years
that sustain the quality of hayfields
for both feed production and habitat.
The field experience also has raised a
number of questions that were not apparent from a review of experimental
economics literature alone, including
questions about which mechanisms
would produce stable revenues over
time or be adaptable to situations
where many increments to ecosystem
services might be possible.
The challenge of ecosystem services is as complex as the complexity of human and ecological systems
combined. Ecosystem services link us
with Nature and progress will often
require a comprehensive approach
with disciplinary, interdisciplinary
and integrated teams on the frontier.

For Further Information
Eagan, K., Herriges, J., Kling, C.L. &
Downing, J. (Forthcoming). Valuing water quality as a function of
water quality measures. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, (in press).

Ferraro, P. J. & Kiss, A. (2002). Direct payments to conserve biodiversity. Science, 298(November
29), 1718–1719.
Ledyard, J. (1995). Public goods: A
Survey of Experimental Research.
Pages 111–249 in The Handbook
of Experimental Economics, J.
Kagel and A. Roth (eds.). Princeton University Press: Princeton,
NJ.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA). (2005). Ecosystems and
Human Well–being: Synthesis. Island Press: Washington, D.C.
Powers, W.M. (1996). Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies: The
Search for a Value of Place. Island
Press: Washington, D.C.
Rich, T. D., Beardmore, C. J., Berlanga, H., Blancher, P. J., Bradstreet,
M.S.W., Butcher, G. S., Demarest, D. W., Dunn, E. H., Hunter,
W. C., Iñigo–Elias, E. E., Kennedy, J. A., Martell, A. M., Panjabi,
A. O., Pashley, D. N., Rosenberg,
K. V., Rustay, C. M., Wendt, J. S.,
& Will, T. C. (2004). Partners in
Flight North American Landbird
Conservation Plan. Cornell Lab
of Ornithology. Ithaca, NY. Retrieved June 12, 2008 from Partners in Flight website http://www.
partnersinflight.org/cont_plan/
(VERSION: March 2005).
Trust for Public Land. (2004). Land
Vote 2003. The Trust for Public
Land: Boston, MA.
U.S. Long Term Ecological Research
Network (LTER). (2007). The
Decadal Plan for LTER: Integrative Science for Society and the
Environment. LTER Network
Office Publication Series No. 24:
Albuquerque, N.M.

Ferraro, P. J. (2001). Global habitat
protection: Limitations of development interventions and a role
for conservation performance
payments. Conservation Biology,
15(4), 990–1000.
2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2)

CHOICES	51

Stephen K. Swallow is a Professor (swallow@uri.edu), Elizabeth C. Smith is
a PhD candidate (lizcsmith@gmail.
com), Emi Uchida is an Assistant Professor (emi@uri.edu), and Christopher
M. Anderson is an Associate Professor
(cma@uri.edu), Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island,
Kingston, R.I.

52

CHOICES

This essay reflects significant support
from a USDA/NRCS/Conservation Innovation Grant; USDA/CSREES/NRI
Grant for Managed Ecosystems; the
Rhode Island Agricultural Experiment
Station W–1133/2133 (contribution
no. 5142); a NOAA Fellowship in
Marine Resource Economics; an NSF/
LTER Social Science Supplement to
VCR; and collaboration with EcoAsset
Markets Inc.

2nd Quarter 2008 • 23(2)

